| Issue |
Security and Safety
Volume 4, 2025
Security and Safety for Next Generation Industrial Systems
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Article Number | 2025013 | |
| Number of page(s) | 21 | |
| Section | Industrial Control | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/sands/2025013 | |
| Published online | 27 October 2025 | |
Research Article
Optimized adaptive asymptotic control for leaderless multi-agent systems under deception attacks
1
Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems, Tongji University, Shanghai, 200092, China
2
College of Electronic and Information Engineering, the Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, 200092, China
3
School of Information Science and Engineering, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200237, China
* Corresponding author (email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Received:
27
March
2025
Revised:
19
July
2025
Accepted:
15
September
2025
This article concentrate on optimized adaptive consensus control problem for the nonlinear multi-agent systems subjected to deception attacks. To mitigate the influence of false data on the system, the transformed tracking error is formulated under the backstepping technique, and the optimized consensus control strategy incorporating Nussbaum technique is utilized to eliminate the destabilizing effects of time-varying gains in the attack. The proposed critic-actor structured reinforcement learning optimal algorithm executes control actions via the actor neural network and evaluates system performance through the critic neural network, enabling the closed-loop system to achieve optimized tracking control performance. Based on the Lyapunov stability method, it is demonstrated that all signals bounded within the closed-loop system, ensuring the achievement of asymptotic output consensus. To illustrate the efficacy of the proposed control approach, some simulation results are finally presented.
Key words: Cooperative control / Critic-actor architecture / Deception attacks / Optimized backstepping technique
Citation: Du Z, Zhang H and Wang Z et al. Optimized adaptive asymptotic control for leaderless multi-agent systems under deception attacks. Security and Safety 2025; 4: 2025013. https://doi.org/10.1051/sands/2025013
© The Author(s) 2025. Published by EDP Sciences and China Science Publishing & Media Ltd.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
Due to its extensive potential in real-world applications, the field of cooperative control in multi-agent systems (MASs) has recently garnered widespread notice [1–6]. As a cornerstone challenge in cooperative control, the consensus control strategy forces a cluster of agents to reach a common state through appropriate control strategies. The consensus challenges in MASs have been thoroughly investigated over the years [7–10]. For example, in [11], the authors present a power-efficient secure full-duplex integrated sensing and communication framework that ensures uplink and downlink secrecy while enabling radar sensing of eavesdroppers through joint beamforming and artificial noise design. The adaptive neural-network-based distributed control approach was introduced for the nonlinear MASs with unmodeled dynamics in [12]. Liang et al. [13] introduced the adaptive consensus control method of the nonaffine MASs subject to dynamic disturbance. However, the above achievements in [8–10, 12, 13] cannot obtain the optimal solution. Therefore, it is crucial to discover an appropriate control technique for MASs that can achieve the control goal while minimizing energy usage.
Optimal control, which can get the optimal solution by consuming minimal cost, has attracted significant attention. Theoretically, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is a powerful tool to handle the optimal control problems [14–16]. Nonetheless, it is challenging to derive an analytical solution because of the high degree of nonlinearity and intractability. Consequently, policy iteration and reinforcement learning (RL) pave the way to address such challenging problem. The RL algorithm is a potent tool in dealing with the adaptive optimal control problems based on actor-critic architectures. The HJB equation for optimal control problem was solved by actor-critic-identifier architecture in [17], where the identifier radial basis function neural network (RBF NN) was employed to approximate the unknown nonlinearities term. Wen et al. [18] examined the optimal control problem for a single system by employing the simplified RL based on actor-critic-identifier architecture. The adaptive control problem of discrete-time MASs suffering from actuator faults was addressed in [19] by utilizing a reinforcement learning strategy. In [20], the integration of a boundary function with a neural network yielded a robust cost control strategy for uncertain systems.
In spite of the progress, the results mentioned above did not consider the question of attacks that need to be considered in cyber-physical systems [21–26]. The deception attacks means that attackers maliciously transmitting false sensor data to the controller when sensors are attacked, potentially leading to a decline in control performance and even to system instability. To solve the difficulty, a number of useful methods have been proposed. A detection method was proposed to detect deception attacks for the cyber-physical systems in [27]. A recursive filtering approach was introduced in [28] to handle stochastic systems compromised by the cyber attacks. In the case of the attackers send false sensor data, Ren et al. [29] formulated an adaptive control algorithm by utilizing the boundedness property of the Nussbaum function, which resisted the potential impact of external attacks on the stability of the controller. Taking the presence of deception attacks into account for uncertain nonlinear systems, an anti-attack controller was studied in [30] using a backstepping technique. Due to the uncertainty of state feedback coefficients altered by deception attacks, there are limited mathematical tools available to optimally guarantee the asymptotic stability of the MASs.
Motivated by this, this article is centered around the optimized adaptive cooperative control for the nonlinear MASs subject to deception attacks. In contrast to [28], the recommended control scheme can realize asymptotic output consensus by introducing the Nussbaum function and constructing a special synchronization error, which effectively removes the restrictive condition that the state feedback coefficients caused by deception attacks in [28] are compelled to be known. One more thing, by constructing a special synchronization error, the effect of the false state information can be effectively eliminated, leading to asymptotic consensus among the outputs of all subsystems, which cannot be done by the existing control strategies in [28–30]. Additionally, by adopting the negative gradient of a positive function to design the update rate, which effectively circumvents the computational burden associated with utilizing the gradient descent algorithm.
The organization of this article is outlined: Section 2 covers the preliminary concepts; the adaptive optimal controller is constructed by the action of Nussbaum technique and NN-based RL in Section 3 and a illustrative example based investigation is carried out in Section 4; the overall content is summarized in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Algebraic graph theory
We consider a topology structure composed of N agents with strong connectivity properties to each other. The topology of this group is described by 𝒢 = (𝒵,ℒ,𝒜), where ℒ ∈ 𝒵 × 𝒵 indicates the edge set, and 𝒵 = {𝒵i|i∈I[1,N]} denotes the node set. We use (𝒵j,𝒵i) ∈ ℒ to represent a directed link, which implies that agent i transmits the message directly to agent j. Let Ni = {𝒵j ∣ (𝒵j, 𝒵i ∈ ℒ, i ≠ j)} represents all the neighbor nodes of the i-th agent. A adjacency matrix 𝒜 = [ai, j] ∈ RN × N is associated to graph 𝒢 with elements ai, j > 0, else ai, j = 0. Clearly, the diagonal elements ai, i = 0. The diagonal matrix is represented as 𝒟 = diag{d1, …, dN}, where
. The Laplacian matrix is ℘ = 𝒟 − 𝒜.
2.2. Problem statement
Consider the following leaderless nonlinear MASs with deception attacks:
where
denote the state vectors,
depicts continuous functions with nonlinear properties, ui ∈ R is the input, yi ∈ R is the output. When the sensor is attacked, the tampered measurement
is the only signal that can be received. The available compromised system states
can be written as
where ψ(ζi, k(t),t) capture sensor attacks,
, and
is a time varying bounded variable. Then, we have
where
. Thus, the leaderless nonlinear MASs under deception attacks becomes
To accomplish these objectives, we rely on the following two standard assumptions and one lemma regarding system dynamics.
Assumption 1 [12]: The leader’s output is m-order continuous differentiable.
Assumption 2 [29, 30]: The variable
satisfies
. |ϖi, k(t)| ≤ ϖmax and
are bounded with ϖmax being unknown constants.
This Assumption 2 ensures that
, preventing a singularity in which the attack gain
would cancel the system state (
), resulting in a complete loss of state information.
[32] If N(τ) is a Nussbaum-type function, such that the following formulas hold
and we select N(τ)=expτ2sin(π τ) in the paper.
[33] Define smooth function V(t)≥0 and ν(t) on [0, ta] with their initials τ(0) being bounded. For
and
, if exists a Nussbaum function N(ν(t)) satisfies
where
is a bounded varying function, then V(t), ν(t) and
must be bounded on [0, ta].
Before the attack compensation optimization controller is designed, some relevant constants some constants are proposed to facilitate arithmetic.
represent the available compromised system states vectors, where k = 1, 2, …, m. ϑi, k and ϑi, m + 1 are defined as
, where
are the ideal weight vectors. We define
is the estimation of θi, k, and
is the approximation error with
. We define that
represent the estimation of ϑi, m + 1, and
is the approximation error with
.
is the ideal weight vector and
depicts the basis function vector. Moreover, ρi, l and ρi, m are defined as
, where l = 1, …, m − 1. Then, we define that
are the estimations of ρi, k, and
are the errors with
.
Control objective: The goal is to design an optimal controller by minimizing the performance function associated with system (2), such that:
(1) The signals
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
, ζi, k, and ui are all bounded, while
, and ζi, 1 − ζj, 1 converge to zero as t → ∞.
(2) Asymptotic consensus among the outputs of all subsystems are achieved.
3. Main results
This section focuses on the progressive design of an optimized adaptive control method for the nonlinear leaderless MASs subjected to deceptive attacks. In the context of controller design for the i-th agent, cooperative errors and virtual tracking errors are respectively given as
where
, and αi, l − 1 (l = 2, 3, …, m), is the virtual controller. Based on
and (5), follows that
Remark2 The attackers send false state information to the controller when the sensors are attacked. We reveal that the traditional backstepping approach requires real state information xi, l in the synchronization error for MASs with l = 1, …, m, which cannot be directly applied. By constructing a special synchronization error and introducing the Nussbaum function technique, our proposed control scheme can achieve asymptotic output consensus.
Step 1: From (2) and (4), the following relation can be derived
The performance index
integrates the tracking error
and the optimized virtual input
to balance tracking accuracy and control cost.
where
is the cost function. Under the optimal performance
, treat the virtual tracking error as
, i.e., view
as
. Then, the HJB equation is decomposed as
By calculating
, it established that
. Then, the term
can be decomposed as
where ai, 1 is positive parameter,
,
,
, δi, 1 and
are positive constants,
represents the basis function vector, q1 is the dimension of the input vector,
. Then, we have
Note that
is unknown. Thus, the RBF NNs are employed for approximate
. According to the introduction of RBF NNs in Section II, We have
where ϵJ i, 1 represents the approximation error.
Substituting (10) into (9) and (8), it follows that
Note that
and
are unavailable due to the presence of the unknown ideal weight WJ
i, 1. To this end, the NN-based RL pave the way to tackle the difficulty.
The performance function under the critic NN and the optimal virtual control under the actor NN are designed as follows:
where
is the estimation of
,
is identified as the estimate of
, the weights are symbolized as
and
.
The update laws
and
are set as
where βc
i, 1 > 0 and βa
i, 1 > 0 are the parameters,
and
.
By combining (7), (11) and (12), it yields that
Along with the fact that
, the following residual error is obtained
Under the optimal control strategy
, ei, 1(t) is anticipated to be zero, and yielding the following relationship.
In order to satisfy (15), a positive function can be defined as
It is noticeable that Pi, 1(t) is equal to (15) when Pi, 1(t)=0. By the derivative calculation,
. According to (13), one can deduce
According to the above analysis, (13) guarantee that Pi, 1(t)=0 can be achieved eventually. Furthermore, the optimal signal
can be derived.
Remark 3 The design of
and
is achieved via employing the negative gradient of the quadratic function Pi, 1(t), alleviating the computational burden compared to employing the gradient descent algorithm.
According to (1) and (6),
is obtained by
Selected the Lyapunov function candidate as
where
and
.
The functional derivatives of Vi, 1(t) is computed along (16), which yields
where
and
.
The RBF NNs
are utilized to approximate
. Then, we have
where |ϵi, 1|≤εi, 1. By applying Young’s inequality, the unknown parameter vector
is lumped into a scalar such that
. This significantly reduces the number of parameters to be estimated.
Considering the optimal virtual controller (12) with the (18), from (17), we derived
By employing Young’s inequality, it is deduced that
The adaptive laws are formulated as follows to estimate the sensor bias fault
According to (13) and (19)–(21), it yields
where
and
.
By using
and
, it follows that
Utilizing the Young’s inequality scaling, it decomposes as
and
Substituting (23)–(25) into (22), it yields
where
.
Step
l
(l = 2, …, m − 1): According to (5),
is computed as
The optimal cost function corresponding to
is expressed as
where
.
The approach similar to the previous step can further derive the following HJB equation.
By solving
, the relationship that relates
to
is
Then, the term
is decomposed as
where ai, l is positive parameter,
,
,
, δi, l and
are positive constants,
denotes the basis function vector, and
.
On the grounds of (28), the optimal control (27) is expressed as
Since
is unknown but continuous, NNs are employed to estimate
. Then, we have
where ϵJ i, l represents the approximation error.
According to (29), we get
and
as
The optimal control items (30) and (31) contain the unknown ideal weight
. According to (11) and (12),
and
pave the way with the critic-actor NN to tackle such intractable problem, which presented as
Similar to the previous method, the updating laws
and
are crafted as
where
and
.
Establishing the Lyapunov function as
where
and
. According to (6),
is derived as
where
,
, and
.
Due to the fact that
includes unknown functions, the RBF NNs
are used to estimate
. Then, one has
where
.
By substituting (32), (33) and (36) into (35), it can obtains that
As in the first step of (20), we get
The adaptive laws can be designed as
By substituting (34), (38) and (39) into (37), we can yield that
where
and
.
By using
and
, one obtains
From (26) and (40)–(42), we have
where
.
Step
m
: The functional derivatives of
is calculated by the definition of (5), one has
We define
as the optimal controller. Comparable to step l, one has
where
is the cost function.
Under the action of the optimal intermediate controller the HJB equation is deduced as
By calculating
, we have
. According to the above analysis, the gradient term
is segmented as
where
.
The optimal intermediate controller
is given by
Since
is unknown but continuous. With the approximation properties of NNs, we get
where ϵJ i, m represents the approximation error.
In light of (45), it follows that
Note that
and
are unavailable because the ideal weight
is unknown. The NNs-based RL pave the way to tackle such intractable problem.
By introducing NNs, we can obtain
Following the same procedure as before,
and
can be given by
where
and
.
Combining
with (1) and (6), it yields
Consider the Vi, m(t) as
where
and
. Then, according with (48) yields that
where
,
, and
.
Due to the fact that
includes unknown functions, the RBF NNs
are harnessed for estimate
. As a result, we obtain
where
, δi, m > 0 and
and
.
Inserting (50) into (49), we see that
In line with step l, we hold
Analogous to the above analysis, virtual controllers and adaptive laws is constructed as
where ai, m is a positive parameter.
The formula for −si, mϖi, mαi, m yields that
where
, δi, m + 1 and
are positive constants.
Inserting (52)–(56) into (51), it boils down to
where
and
.
Setting αi, m + 1 and
as
According to (43) and (57)–(59), we have
where
.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we devise the controllers (12), (33), (46), (55), (58), and the updating laws (13), (21), (34), (39), (47), (53), (54), (59) for the MASs (1) to achieve that all signals are bounded, the outputs of all subsystems reach a consensus asymptotically.
Proof: Defining
. Then,
is obtained by
Let
, where l = 1, 2, …, m − 1 and i = 1, …, N.
Integrating both sides of (60), one gets
where
.
By Lemma 1, it follows that the variables V(t), τi, k,
, τi, m + 1,
, as well as the integrals
,
and
must be bounded on [0, ta) with k = 1, …, m. According to [34], we have ta = +∞. Based on the above results, it can be obtained that ϑi, k,
, ϑi, m + 1,
and
are all uniformly bounded. Furthermore, using the definitions
,
,
,
and
, it follows that
,
,
,
and
are also bounded. The boundedness of ζi, k follows directly from the boundedness the synchronization error. Finally, based on (44), we obtain that the system input ui is bounded.
According to (61),
and
are bounded. Then, it follows that the derivative of
is bounded. Further, by employing Barbalat’s Lemma, we can derive limt → ∞si, 1(t)=0 with i = 1, 2, …, N. Then, we have
. According to (5) and [35], one has
where
,
and
.
According to graph theory, since the communication topology includes a spanning tree, ℘ has a zero eigenvalue with the corresponding eigenvector being 1N. The other eigenvalues of ℘ lie in the open right half-plane.
By matrix transformation, we can get
where P is a matrix that is definitively positive,
is the Jordan canonical form of ℘ and γ
P−1 = [01 × N, Π(N − 1)×N]. By defining
,
is calculated as
According to (62), we can get
and η1(t)=η1(0) where η1 is the first entry of η.
By defining
and
, the derivative of
is
Given that B > 0 and
is bounded, it follows that ||η|| is also bounded. Construct Lyapunov function as
, where Q represents the solution of BTQ + Q
B = −2I. Further, we have
. Then, we get
Since
is bounded, we get that
is bounded. By using Barbalat’s Lemma, we know
. Since the first column of P is 1N, we have
where p is the first row of P−1. Further, we can derive the output will reach consensus asymptotically. Then,
and limt → ∞(ζi, 1 − ζj, 1)=0 are achieved.
Remark 5 By constructing a special synchronization error, this article can achieve asymptotic output consensus of MASs even if the attackers send false state information. The strategies for deceptive attacks are successfully broadened from addressing the stabilization challenge of a single system to tackling the consensus control issue in MASs.
Remark 6 The existing adaptive control works [29–31] are confined to address the stabilization problem of the individual system and are only capable of reaching a small neighborhood around the origin for the system state. Through further improvement, our proposed control method can achieve asymptotic output consensus for MASs and is more suited for high-precision practical applications.
![]() |
Figure 1. The communication topology |
![]() |
Figure 2. The system outputs ζi, 1 |
![]() |
Figure 3. The system states ζi, 2 |
Remark Our current approach emphasizes attack compensation rather than explicit detection. A promising future direction is to integrate a two-layer defense: first, a residual-based detector monitors discrepancies between system measurements and model predictions to identify attacks [36, 37]; subsequently, the resilient control framework activates targeted countermeasures.
4. Illustrative example
A numerical example is considered in the simulation. The topology structure among the 1−4 agents are illustrated in Figure 1.
![]() |
Figure 4. Available compromised system states over time. (a) The available compromised system states |
![]() |
Figure 5. The signals of control input ui |
The connectivity is algebraically illustrated by the following adjacency matrix:
![]() |
Figure 6. The curves of |
![]() |
Figure 7. The curves of |
Each follower is modeled as
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4. For the condition of t ≥ 2, the attack weight is chosen as
.
The parameters are set as ai, 1 = ai, 2 = 4, βa
i, 1 = βa
i, 2 = 2, βc
i, 1 = βc
i, 2 = 1.2,
, mi = 0.05, νi, 1 = νi, 2 = νi, 3 = 0.1exp(−0.1t) and hi = 2.6exp(−0.1t). The initial conditions are ζ1, 1(0)=0.5, ζ2, 1(0)=1.2, ζ3, 1(0)= − 1.5, ζ4, 1(0)= − 0.8, ζ1, 2(0)= − 1, ζ2, 2(0)=0.5, ζ3, 2(0)= − 1, ζ4, 2(0)= − 0.5,
,
,
,
,
,
,
and τi, 3(0)=0.
![]() |
Figure 8. Comparison of |
Figure 2 displays the system output trajectories of the four agents. The results in Figure 3 illustrates the variation curves of state xi, 2. Figures 4a and 4b present two graphical representations of the available compromised system states
and
. After 2s, the attacker causes the sensor to transmit incorrect status information by tampering with the transmitted information, which can arouse the degradation of control performance. It is shown that agents can quickly achieve consensus under deception attacks. The controller ui are demonstrated in Figure 5. Then, the weight estimations of actor NNs and critic NNs are depicted in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. In Figures 6 and 7, the proposed control strategy will eventually get
and
. The norms of all the NN weight estimates eventually converge. According to (15), when
, the HJB optimality condition is satisfied. Figure 8 illustrates the system convergence under different
deception attacks. It can be observed that the proposed method is able to achieve convergence even under stronger attacks.
5. Conclusions
This article has presented the optimized adaptive consensus control strategy designed for the nonlinear MASs amid deception attacks. The optimized adaptive controller, designed by incorporating Nussbaum technique, has been developed by addressing the influence of deception attacks containing time-varying gain. Taking a special synchronization error within the control scheme, the leaderless MASs can achieve asymptotic output consensus. Finally, the simulation outcomes have validated the efficacy of the suggested protocol.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank all editors and reviewers who helped us improve the paper.
Funding
This work is supported by in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (62433014, 62088101), in part by the Shanghai International Science and Technology Cooperation Project (21550760900, 22510712000), in part by Shanghai Key Laboratory of Wearable Robotics and Human-Machine Interaction and in part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.
Conflicts of interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Data availability statement
No data are associated with this article.
Author contribution statement
Zhixu Du wrote and structured the paper, and carried out the theoretical derivations, inspections, and simulation experiments. Hao Zhang mainly surveyed the related work and jointly wrote the paper. Zhuping Wang and Sheng Gao discussed the recent developments, corrected typos, and jointly wrote the paper.
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Zhixu Du received the B.Sc. degree in automation from Shanxi Datong University, Datong, China, in 2018, and the M.S. degree in control theory and control engineering from Bohai University, Jinzhou, China, in 2022. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. degree in the School of Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems from Tongji University, Shanghai, China. His research interests include multi-agent systems, adaptive fuzzy/neural control, and distributed predictive control.

Hao Zhang received the B.Sc. degree in automatic control from Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, China, in 2001 and received Ph.D. degree in control theory and control engineering from Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China, in 2007. Currently, she is a Professor with the School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, China. From December 2011 to December 2013, she was a Postdoctoral Fellow with the City University of Hong Kong. Her research interests include network-based control systems and multi-agent systems.

Zhuping Wang received the B.Eng. degree in electrical technology and the M.Eng. degree in electrical drive and automation from the Department of Automatic Control, Northwestern Polytechnic University, Xi’an, China, in 1994 and 1997, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in intelligent robot from the National University of Singapore, Singapore, in 2003. She is currently a Professor with the School of Electronics and Information Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai, China. Her current research interests include intelligent control of robotic systems, self-driving vehicles, and multi-agent systems.

Sheng Gao received the B.Sc. degree in automation from Donghua University, Shanghai, China in 2019, and the Ph.D. degree in control science and engineering from Tongji University, Shanghai, China, in 2025. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow with the School of Information Science and Engineering, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, China. From January to March 2024, he was a Visiting Ph.D. Student with the Chair of Intelligent Control Systems, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany. His current research interests include optimal control, cyber-physical systems, robot and cyber security.
All Figures
![]() |
Figure 1. The communication topology |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 2. The system outputs ζi, 1 |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 3. The system states ζi, 2 |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 4. Available compromised system states over time. (a) The available compromised system states |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 5. The signals of control input ui |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 6. The curves of |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 7. The curves of |
| In the text | |
![]() |
Figure 8. Comparison of |
| In the text | |
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![$$ \begin{aligned} V(t)\le \bar{\varsigma }_{a}+\int ^{t}_{0}[\nu (\bar{\kappa }) N(\nu )+\bar{\varsigma }_{b}]\dot{\nu }d\bar{\kappa }, \end{aligned} $$](/articles/sands/full_html/2025/01/sands20250009/sands20250009-eq22.gif)










































































![$$ \begin{aligned} \dot{V}(t)\le &\sum ^{N}_{i=1}\Bigg [-\sum ^{m-1}_{k=1} \Big (a_{i,k}-1\Big )s^{2}_{i,k}-\Big (a_{i,m}-\frac{1}{2}\Big )s^{2}_{i,m}+\sum ^{m}_{k=1}\Big (\big (N(\tau _{i,k}) \varpi ^{2}_{i,k}+1\big )\dot{\tau }_{i,k}\\&+\big (N(\breve{\tau }_{i,k})\varpi _{i,k}^{2}+1\big ) \dot{\breve{\tau }}_{i,k}\Big )+\Big (N(\tau _{i,m+1}) \varpi _{i,m}+1\Big )\dot{\tau }_{i,m+1} +\sum ^{m}_{k=1}\mu _{i,k}\Bigg ]. \end{aligned} $$](/articles/sands/full_html/2025/01/sands20250009/sands20250009-eq253.gif)
![$$ \begin{aligned} \dot{V}(t)\le &\sum ^{N}_{i=1}\Bigg [-\sum ^{m}_{k=1} \varsigma s^{2}_{i,k}+\sum ^{m}_{k=1}\big (N(\tau _{i,k}) \varpi _{i,k}^{2}+1\big )\dot{\tau }_{i,k}+\sum ^{m}_{k=1} \big (N(\breve{\tau }_{i,k})\varpi _{i,k}^{2}+1\big ) \dot{\breve{\tau }}_{i,k} \nonumber \\&+\Big (N(\tau _{i,m+1})\varpi _{i,m}+1\Big ) \dot{\tau }_{i,m+1}+\sum ^{m}_{k=1}\mu _{i,k}\Bigg ]. \end{aligned} $$](/articles/sands/full_html/2025/01/sands20250009/sands20250009-eq255.gif)
![$$ \begin{aligned} V(t)\le &\lambda +\int ^{t}_{0}\sum ^{N}_{i=1} \Bigg [\sum ^{m}_{k=1}\big (N(\tau _{i,k})\varpi _{i,k}^{2} +1\big )\dot{\tau }_{i,k}+\sum ^{m}_{k=1} \big (N(\breve{\tau }_{i,k})\varpi _{i,k}^{2} +1\big )\dot{\breve{\tau }}_{i,k} \nonumber \\&+\Big (N(\tau _{i,m+1})\varpi _{i,m}+1\Big ) \dot{\tau }_{i,m+1}\Bigg ]d\bar{\kappa }, \end{aligned} $$](/articles/sands/full_html/2025/01/sands20250009/sands20250009-eq256.gif)












![$$ \begin{aligned} \mathcal{A} =\left[ \begin{array}{ccccc} 0&0&1&1\\ 1&0&0&0\\ 0&0&0&1\\ 0&1&0&0\\ \end{array} \right]. \end{aligned} $$](/articles/sands/full_html/2025/01/sands20250009/sands20250009-eq305.gif)













