Table 2.

Taxonomy of cyber-physical attacks in STDC loops

Attack Characteristics Implementation Methods Potential Impacts Ref.
DIA Malicious alteration ofsensor/control data Injection of forged telemetry data via compromised PMUs/RTUs Erroneous state estimation, incorrect dispatch decisions, equipment overload [24, 25]

Replay Attack Re-transmission of outdated or fraudulent data Delayed/rescheduled injection of historic sensorsignals Temporal confusionin control systems, synchronization failures [25]

Aurora Attack Physical destruction of grid components via unauthorized circuit breaker control Exploitation of unsecured SCADA protocols to manipulate circuit breaker status Permanent equipment damage, grid instability [26]

FDIA Corrupted state estimation via manipulated sensor inputs Injection of biased voltage/load measurements into EMS Incorrect load balancing, line overloads, cascading failures [27, 28]

LRA Strategic manipulation of load distribution Targeted falsification of demand response signals Overloading of critical lines, blackouts [29]

DoS Disruption of communication channels Flooding networks with traffic, jamming RF signals Loss of real-time situational awareness, delayed control commands [30, 31]

Covert Attack Stealthy manipulation of consensus protocols Sybil attacks on distributed control systems Degraded system resilience, undetected data corruption [31]

Protocol Exploits Targeted attacks on communication standards Injection of malformed packets into IEC 61850/Modbus protocols Protocol-level failures, device misoperation [32, 33]

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